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Background: The threat posed by Meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
has taken on an increasingly pan-European dimension. This article aims to provide an 
overview of the different approaches to the control of MRSA adopted in five European 
countries (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, and the UK) and discusses data and 
reporting mechanisms, regulations, guidelines, and health policy approaches with a 
focus on risk communication. Our hypothesis is that current infection control practices in 
different European countries are implicit messages that contribute to the health-related 
risk communication and subsequently to the public perception of risk posed by MRSA. 
A reporting template was used to systematically collect information from each country.
Discussion: Large variation in approaches was observed between countries. However, 
there were a number of consistent themes relevant to the communication of key infor-
mation regarding MRSA, including misleading messages, inconsistencies in content and 
application of published guidelines, and frictions between the official communication and 
their adoption on provider level.
summary: The variability of recommendations within, and across, countries could 
be contributing to the perception of inconsistency. Having inconsistent guidelines and 
practices in place may also be affecting the level at which recommended behaviors are 
adopted. The discrepancy between the official, explicit health messages around MRSA 
and the implicit messages stemming from the performance of infection control measures 
should, therefore, be a key target for those wishing to improve risk communication.
Keywords: meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, health-care-associated infections, risk communication, 
infection control, health policy
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inTrODUcTiOn
Health-care-associated infections (HCAIs) place a significant 
burden on health systems in terms of both morbidity and 
mortality, and their effects are felt far beyond just those utilizing 
health-care services (1). An already serious situation is now being 
exacerbated by the growth of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, such 
as meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). MRSA is 
a bacterium which is resistant to β-lactam antibiotics, a group of 
antibiotic treatments that includes penicillin and cephalosporin. 
Infection with MRSA can lead to a variety of sequelae, includ-
ing ventilator-associated pneumonia, chronic wound infection, 
bloodstream infection (bacteremia), and septic conditions, which 
in some circumstances can lead to death.
The prevalence of MRSA varies across Europe, with a general 
trend of increasing prevalence from north to the south (2–4). The 
reasons for these observed differences are not yet fully under-
stood, although variation in prevention and control strategies 
(5), design of health-care facilities (6), staff to patient ratios (7), 
patterns of antibiotic usage (8), and the implementation of anti-
biotic stewardship (9, 10) are thought to be contributing factors. 
As travel between European states becomes more common, with 
citizens free, within certain limits, to pursue elective treatment in 
a European country other than their own, the scope for transmis-
sion of infectious pathogens to areas where they are not endemic 
becomes ever greater (11, 12). Therefore, cross-border regions 
now face a particular challenge in coping with patients coming 
from neighboring countries where different regulations and 
practices are in place to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious 
agents (13). The rise of MRSA and the European cross border 
health-care legislation to allow treatment in another EU coun-
try have led to the formation of a number of MRSA networks, 
founded on bilateral agreements between countries with shared 
borders about how best to manage the issues outlined above (14).
Increases in the burden associated with HCAIs and the 
growth of antimicrobial resistance have led to heightened 
awareness both within the lay population and among politicians 
(15). The Chief Medical Officer in the UK has even gone so far 
as to place the threat posed by antimicrobial resistant on a par 
with that of terrorism (16). The European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) has placed the “Antimicrobial 
Resistance and Healthcare-Associated Infections Programme” 
among its top priorities for the future (17). The ECDC has also 
stated that a major part of the problem stems from deficiencies 
in the way health-related issues are communicated, and has 
encouraged EU member states to improve their risk communi-
cation strategies (18).
Risk communication is a wide and multi-faceted field, and is 
considered an important approach in the fight against the spread 
of infectious diseases through the impact it can have on the 
adoption of appropriate behaviors, e.g., frequent hand washing to 
limit carriage and infection (19). Recent research has highlighted 
a number of areas which are key to understanding effective risk 
communication, such as the nature and quality of information 
provided to patients and health-care workers (20), patients’ and 
the general public’s perceived information needs (21, 22), and role 
of the media (23). However, little research has been carried out 
into the impact of institutional arrangements on specific com-
munication strategies (24).
We conceptualize risk communication as not simply explicit 
communications but also the implicit messages of institutional 
arrangements (differences in policies, inconsistencies of imple-
mentation, etc.). In order to test this assumption, we examined the 
implementation of various MRSA policies across five European 
countries for any evidence that environmental factors contribute 
as implicit and “autonomous” risk communication next to tradi-
tional explicit and “voluntary” forms.
The article begins by discussing the situation in each of the 
countries with regard to the following areas, while reflecting on 
the underlying epidemiological rationale for each:
• data and reporting mechanisms,
• regulations and guidelines,
• health policy approaches with a focus on risk communication, 
and
• implicit messages of current practices.
In the second section, we move on to discuss how different 
national strategies to contain MRSA infection are implicit “mes-
sages” and contribute to explicit risk communication strategies.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
We collected information on the situation with regard to MRSA 
in five European countries until 2011: Austria, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. These countries were chosen 
as they represent varying prevalence, response strategies, overall 
health system organization and modes of communication.
A template was designed to systematically collect information 
about five areas: (1) data collection and reporting mechanisms; 
(2) the regulatory framework; (3) clinical guideline design; (4) 
implementation of guidelines; and (5) other relevant health 
policy measures. The intended and unintended effects of policies 
in each of these categories were then compared to explicit com-
munication strategies first by country and then across countries. 
Information was drawn from scientific and gray literature and 
complemented, where necessary, by stakeholder interviews.
To help interpret the results and how the various measures 
compare to one another, we developed a stepwise classification 
for different stages of MRSA (see Table 1).
resUlTs
We present narratively a summary of results; the details can be 
found in Table 2.
Data situation
Of the five countries, three countries have mandatory reporting 
(Germany, Netherlands, and UK), while others (Austria and 
Spain) report on a voluntary basis. Only the Netherlands report 
MRSA from colonization level onward; the majority of countries 
(Austria, Germany, Spain, UK) only report bacteremia (level 
III), which is the most serious consequence of infection and only 
present in a minority of cases. The UK, however, also screen for 
MRSA status prior to elective surgery, but this information is 
TaBle 1 | classification of meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(Mrsa) from an infection control perspective.
Level I Colonization MRSA can be found on the skin, in the nasal cavity, or 
in a wound. The colonization itself is not an ostensible 
health problem; however, it can lead to an acute infection 
and most importantly MRSA is contagious from the level 
of colonization on. Healthy people are still healthy with 
MRSA colonization, but could spread the bacterium to 
others. For ill people, MRSA colonization could lead to 
an infection with the bacterium. With an easy and non-
invasive swab the colonization can be identified. A proven 
colonization can be sanitized with antibiotic cream and 
antiseptic washings
Level II Infection MRSA is on the skin or in the nasal cavities or in wounds 
and causes a reaction in the immune system, e.g., 
inflammation, antibodies, fever, etc. The infection can 
be proven by a blood test showing the systemic signs 
of an immune system reaction, and the bacterium can 
be found locally in the infected area. Patients with a 
compromised immune system or with skin problem 
are more susceptible to develop MRSA infections than 
healthy people
Level III Bacteremia Bacteria can be found in the bloodstream. In combination 
with clinical symptoms, this is called sepsis. A septic 
condition is a serious, life threatening medical condition. 
Bacteremia is proven by a blood sample where bacteria 
can be found. A blood test for bacteremia is only 
performed when medically indicated, e.g., a patient 
developing a septic clinical condition
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not officially reported. There is no consistent information about 
the “contagious burden,” meaning the provision of information 
about colonization and infections, from level I on where MRSA 
is contagious and can be passed to others (25).
regulatory Bodies
Regulatory bodies are built based on the political structure of the 
country where they are based. In Austria, Germany, and Spain 
health-care provision and management is in the responsibility of 
federal states or autonomous communities. The Netherlands and 
the UK follow a national approach.
guidelines
The Netherlands has opted to pursue an active screening policy 
(“search and destroy”). Risk-based testing is in place in Austria, 
Germany, Spain, and the UK, with the UK requiring screening 
of elective admissions to hospitals. Isolation practice for positive 
cases is basically the same in the five countries. However, the 
time lag between entering the hospital and being identified as 
MRSA carrier is critical as a variety of admission procedures, 
examinations, and clinical investigations at the beginning of a 
hospital stay increase the likelihood to spread infectious diseases. 
The Netherlands, again, stand out by placing patients with an 
unknown MRSA status in isolation rooms; Spain places patients 
awaiting their results in isolation as well as, whenever possible 
(individual room availability), those who are previous carriers or 
high-risk patients (in one autonomous community, Catalonia).
Health-care workers in the four countries (Austria, Germany, 
Spain, UK) are not screened on a regular basis, meaning that 
those who are a high-risk group in every countries’ guidelines 
and work where the contracting and spread of infectious disease 
occurs most readily are unaware of their own MRSA status (26). 
The Netherlands screen staff regularly.
implementation
All countries investigated have put legal obligations in place 
to implement their guidelines. However, only sporadic, if any, 
verifications and checks are being carried out.
health Policy
All the countries under investigation have increased their 
awareness for MRSA and have developed national action plans, 
regional and international networks of hospitals and laboratories, 
antibiotic stewardship, strengthened their legislation, and created 
incentives to reduce the prevalence of MRSA (9).
communication
Information and knowledge play a crucial role in the management 
of MRSA, and European health policy also puts special attention 
on communication. All five countries thus prioritize the provi-
sion of information to various target groups (health professionals, 
patients, and general public).
DiscUssiOn
We first comment the results of the five countries, then discuss 
the epidemiological rationale and the implication for risk 
communication.
situation in the Five countries
Reporting
Comprehensive data on prevalence is difficult to obtain as most 
mandatory and voluntary surveillance systems were found to only 
cover MRSA bacteremia. Point prevalence studies and surveys 
that have attempted to capture the situation have also been based 
on information provided by hospitals on a voluntary basis. This 
has contributed to the sporadic nature of evidence around MRSA, 
and thus, current data do not appropriately reflect the ubiquitous 
nature of the treat of infection (3).
Moving the reporting downstream with the reporting of 
bacteremia, level III, is posited to be one way to keep the absolute 
numbers down. In regard to communication, this contributes to 
keeping perception of infection rates artificially low. This could 
be appealing to policy makers as the small numbers reported 
cause less concern than if the prevalence of infection were to be 
revealed (27–29). It is, however, only an artifact of the reporting 
and not reflective of the underlying epidemiology of the infec-
tious disease.
Regulatory Bodies
Having different regulatory bodies could possibly lead to variabil-
ity in terms of guidelines and recommendations and their imple-
mentation. The variability of recommendations within and across 
countries could contribute to the perception of inconsistency.
Guidelines
The rigor of infection control is not appropriately reflected in the 
guidelines: MRSA patients are constantly contagious and not only 
TaBle 2 | Overview of results in five eU countries.
austria germany netherlands spain (catalonia—
autonomous community)
United Kingdom
Reporting situation: 
mandatory reporting 
(frequency; level 
I = colonization, level 
II = infection, level 
III = bacteremia), Register
No mandatory reporting
 – Voluntary basis for hospitals (level III)
 – Annual reporting of routine 
laboratory data (level III)
 – Only one federal states has a 
registry
Mandatory: quarterly reporting of 
bacteremia (level III) to the Robert Koch 
Institute (RKI) (since 07/2009)
 – Voluntary: Point prevalence 
information of infections (level II)
 – No information on colonization  
(level I)
Mandatory reporting of level I-III
 – Samples of bacteria strains 
(level I and II) sent to RIVM for 
classification
No mandatory reporting
 – Unified surveillance 
program (VINCat 
program): annual 
collection of MRSA ratio, 
incidence and bacteremia 
(level III) information
Mandatory weekly reporting of 
bacteremia (level III) since April 
2004
 – Mandatory reporting of MRSA 
mortality
Regulatory bodies, name, 
role: issue guidelines; 
control implementation?, 
impact
Federal approach
 – There is a basic national legal 
frameworka, but each of the nine 
federal states has their own laws.
 – Each Hospital develops its own 
infection control plan
Federal approach with national 
guidance
 – RKI on national level. Health is in 
the responsibility of the 16 federal 
states, thus a commission has been 
established at the RKI representing 
the federal states (Commission for 
Hospital hygiene and Preventions of 
Infections/KRINKO).
 – German Society for Hospital 
Hygiene advises KRINKO
 – While KRINKO releases 
recommendations for the federal 
states, the German Protection 
Infection Act (IfSG) provides the 
legal framework for infection control 
in Germany on national level
National approach
 – Ministry of Health, Welfare, and 
Sports
 – Netherlands Institute for public 
health and the environment 
(RIVM)
 – Health Council of the 
Netherland (GR)
 – The health care inspectorate 
(IGZ)
 – The Dutch working party on 
infection prevention (WIP)
Regional approach
 – Public Health Directorate 
in the Public Health 
Agency
 – Hospital networks have 
established nosocomial 
infection control program 
(VINCat)
 – All regulations apply for 
regional level
National approach
 – England: Care Quality 
Commission (CQC) as laid down 
by the Health and Social Care 
Act 2008; Foundation trusts 
have their own independent 
regulator known as Monitor
 – Scotland: Social Care and 
Social Work Improvement 
Scotland and Healthcare 
Improvement Scotland
 – Wales: Health Inspectorate for 
Wales, created in 2004, and 
the Care and Social Services 
Inspectorate for Wales
 – NI: Regulation and Quality 
Improvement Authority
Guidelines Guidelines: each hospital has its 
own guideline but all refer to the 
recommendations by Institute of 
Microbiology of Universities
Guidelines: German antibiotic 
resistance strategy (DART) KRINKO/
RKI recommendations (Versions: 1999, 
2005, 2011)
Guidelines: “Search and destroy” 
since 1986
Guidelines: consensus 
document: unify treatment 
of MRSA infection by a 
set of evidence-based 
recommendations
Guidelines: the Health and Social 
Care Act (2008) Code of Practice 
for the NHS on the prevention and 
control of health-care-associated 
infections (HCAIs): risk of infection 
posed to patients is kept to a 
minimum
Basic principles Principle
 – Risk-based testing of known or 
highly likely patients
 – Isolation after positive test results
Principle: risk-based testing of known 
or highly likely MRSA patients
 – Isolation when tested positive until 
three negative swaps
 – Barrier nursing for HCW
 – Interventions in MRSA patients 
should be restricted to those 
deemed absolutely necessary
 – No routine screening for patients or 
staff
Principle
Search: Active screening of 
patients and staff. destroy: 
decolonization and treatment 
based on guidelines developed by 
Dutch Working Party on Antibiotic 
Policy (SWAB)
 – Isolation based on risk 
assessment from first contact 
on
Principle
 – Risk-based testing (nasal 
swabs)
 – Isolation for positive and 
waiting for results patients
Principle
 – 10 registration criteria for the 
prevention and control, such as 
information, clean environment, 
identification of infected 
patients, isolation facilities
 – As of 2008 screening of high-
risk cohorts, in particular A&E 
admissions and pre-operative 
surgical assessment patients
 – As of April 2009 all elective 
admissions must be screened 
for MRSA
(Continued )
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austria germany netherlands spain (catalonia—
autonomous community)
United Kingdom
Implementation, routine, 
and consequences
Legal obligation for hospitals to 
implement measure to assure hygiene 
quality
 – Federal states carry out regular 
checks (differ among federal states)
Legal obligation for hospitals to 
implement measure to assure hygiene 
quality
 – Implementation has not been 
routinely controlled yet
Legal obligation for hospitals to 
implement measure to assure 
hygiene quality.
 – Implementation controlled by 
the Health Care Inspectorate
Legal: Infectious diseases 
committees are mandatory 
in the public network of 
hospitals in Catalonia
 – Implementation controlled 
by The Catalonian Health 
Department, throughout 
periodic accreditation 
processes
Legal obligation: Deadline for 
implementation no later than 2011
 – Implementation assessed by the 
CQC
Health policy, national 
action plan, regional 
networks, and antibiotic 
stewardship
 – Quality Committee to contribute 
to the development of quality 
management
 – Networks: National Reference 
Centre for Nosocomial Infections 
and Antibiotics Resistance
 – National Action Plan and a National 
Antimicrobial Strategy is currently 
being developed
 – Antibiotic StewardshipEuropean 
Networks
 – New Infection Protection Act 
regarding nosocomial infections (9 
June 2011).The law is mandatory 
for all 16 Länder and the changes 
have to be implemented by March 
31, 2012 
Key points:
 – Hygiene Commission ART: a 
commission for “anti-infectiva 
resistance and therapy” (ART) is to 
be established with diagnostic and 
treatment list
 – Joint Federal Committee 
“Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss” 
releases guidelines to hygiene and 
quality management
 – Sanitation: the outpatient sanitation 
of MRSA patients should be 
reimbursed better for GPs to 
motivate them to follow up the 
treatment of MRSA outpatients.
 – Strong hospital network especially 
in cross-border regions, e.g., 
EUREGIO Twente/Münsterland
The Dutch Working Party on 
Infection Prevention (WIP)
EUREGIO Twente-Muensterland 
MRSA network
EurSafety Health Net, MRSA 
networks for the Euroegio Meuse 
Rhine, Rhine-Meuse-Nord, Rhine-
Waal, Gronau-Enschede, Ems-
Dollert regio
Some quality indicators 
(prevalence of nosocomial 
infection) are incorporated 
into incentive policies among 
professionals as part of the 
“Management by Objectives” 
approach. Actors involved 
in MRSA policies are: local 
infection control committees, 
infection control nurse, 
consultant in infectious 
diseases, microbiologist, and 
clinical staff
Health Protection Agency
 – collects routine surveillance 
data on infection rates, provides 
training and specialist advice on 
ways to deal with infections
 – acts as a conduit for the 
sharing of information between 
providers
 – works with the general public to 
ensure key information on the 
threats posed by infections is 
easily accessible
Explicit communication, 
information policy, and 
key messages
 – Each hospital creates their own 
guidelines, adapted to their specific 
circumstances and based on the 
hygiene regulations enshrined by 
law and the recommendations 
published by the responsible 
scientific institutions at universities
 – Dissemination of information for 
patients and visitors in an ad hoc 
way
 – In general, little media attention 
regarding MRSA
KRINKO guidelines point out that 
information and communication is key 
to successfully respond to the health 
threat posed by MRSA
 – Information and communication 
needs have not been investigated or 
recommended in the new guidelines
 – Information is available at 
hospitals and nursing homes
 – Information for the general 
public, hospital staff and 
policy makers about MRSA is 
available through the MRSA 
network described above
 – Information available for 
health professionals, 
patients and general 
public
 – Two of the 10 criteria in the 
Code of Practice for the NHS 
on the prevention and control of 
HCAIs relate specifically to the 
provision of information
 – Despite the laws and effort 
surrounding improving 
information the results have 
been mixed
aHospitals and medical institutions Act/Krankenanstalten- und Kuranstaltengesetz.
TaBle 2 | continued
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after identification; health-care workers fall under the risk groups 
for screening in every country, but are, with the exception of the 
Netherlands, not screened.
Implementation
Concerns about the implementation of the guidelines are fre-
quently raised. Surveys from Germany and the UK support these 
findings. The authors showed that a minority of the hospitals have 
consistently implemented guidelines (30, 31).
Health Policy
The consistent adoption of policy in the guidelines and the 
implementation into the daily practice is, however, subject to 
discussion. The gap between the policy and its implementation 
is not just a medical problem but also influences the perception 
of health risks and could affect compliance with the intended 
behavior (32).
Communication
The explicit information strategy is only one aspect of communi-
cation (“voluntary communication”); another aspect is how mes-
sages that are expressed in the official statements are “executed” 
on the ground of the daily reality of health care (“autonomous 
communication”). Infection control measures, their implementa-
tion into the medical environment, and their frictions are tacit 
acts of communication yet little attention has been spent on how 
to monitor and improve the way they contribute to the convey-
ance of key health messages.
epidemiological rationale
Infection Control Approach
There are, generally speaking, two basic strategies for responding 
to infectious diseases that emerge from the analysis: a “specific” 
and a “general” approach.
The specific approach relies on the identification of those 
patients already infected with MRSA. Once an MRSA patient is 
identified and known (“red flagged”), appropriate measures can 
be taken. These measures range from sanitation of skin coloniza-
tion and/or treatment of the infection. The patient should also be 
isolated from the hospital environment in order to prevent the 
transmission of the pathogen. Once an MRSA patient has been 
identified, health-care workers have to wear personal protection 
equipment and apply stringent hygiene measures. The MRSA 
patient’s room is often labeled with a sign signaling the conta-
gious status. There is a general consensus regarding isolation and 
hygiene practices. However, the crucial choice of strategy for 
identification in the specific approach is controversial. Only the 
Netherlands has a pro-active screening policy; all the other coun-
tries studied used a process of reactive screening based on risk 
assessment, with the UK also requiring pre-hospital screening 
for elective admissions. Hospitals across the four “reactive” EU 
countries (Austria, Germany, Spain, UK) appear very reluctant 
to screen patients for a number of reasons. One is that the care 
for and treatment of MRSA patients places greater demands on 
the attending nurses and clinicians, meaning that there could be 
an incentive to avoid correct MRSA classification. Additional 
measures, such as spatial requirements (single isolation rooms), 
differential treatment guidelines, and consequences for staff and 
ward routines, aggravate the situation. Also, at the hospital level, 
it ostensibly requires more time and resources to care for MRSA 
patients and, therefore, those facing budgetary pressure may pos-
sibly be more inclined to avoid diagnosis, despite the fact that the 
costs of cases progressing to bacteremia may outweigh the costs 
of an active screening policy (33–37).
If contagious patients are not identified, a “general” approach 
with stringent measures to guarantee good hygiene has to be 
adhered to by all health-care workers, patients, and visitors. This 
system of infection control includes, among others, requirements 
such as strict hand hygiene, regular cleaning, and disinfection of 
surfaces. To promote the general hygiene approach, good com-
munication is crucial to ensure that everyone is aware of what 
they need to do in order to avoid infection and stop further 
spread. Frictions between infection management and communi-
cation could affect the adoption of the recommended behavior.
Ethical Problems
The handling for MRSA patients raises some ethical questions 
regarding whether there is equal treatment of isolated and conta-
gious patients. The restriction of physical transport and transfer 
forms part of the infection control recommendations in the 
European countries investigated. However, it is an increasingly 
controversial and sensitive aspect of the prescribed treatment 
of MRSA patients as many feel it could compromise the qual-
ity of clinical care (38). Most guidelines recommend that some 
invasive interventions be confined to the room used by MRSA 
patients (39). In the case where interventions performed in the 
patient’s room would be better carried out elsewhere, the lack of 
an optimal environment could lead to reduced performance on 
the part of clinicians. Infectious patients are put at the end of the 
day’s surgery schedule and are more likely to be postponed due 
to emergencies in the surgical program. The avoidance of invasive 
diagnostics alongside being the “last operation on the schedule” 
could comprise the medical treatment of an often critically ill 
patient.
Organizational Aspects
Meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus is also an occupational 
health problem. Health-care workers are not routinely screened for 
MRSA colonization or infection—apart from in the Netherlands. 
This reluctance to identify infectious staff could be seen in the 
context of health-care organization. If a staff member is colonized 
with MRSA, they are not allowed to work in their usual locations. 
This poses a burden to the workplace organization in terms of the 
potential for inconsistent labor supply, in particular in an already 
overstretched working environment. Hospitals and countries 
in which the intensive care unit carer/nurse to patient ratio is 
1:1 report basically no problems of nosocomial infections (40). 
This adds weight to the hypothesis that a major contributor to 
increasing prevalence of MRSA is the high patient–health-care 
worker ratio (41).
Architecture
The guidelines also point out the importance of spatial distanc-
ing and the role of architecture—a challenge which has not been 
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met by modern hospitals and it remains unclear whether this 
concern regarding the spread of infectious disease will be met 
in the future (6).
risk communication strategy
The “general” approach, i.e., the basic tools for fighting an infec-
tious disease epidemic, all features prominently in all national 
guidelines: knowledge, training, information, networks, and 
collaboration. But the question remains of how well are the 
recommendations implemented at the provider levels especially 
in terms of their risk communication practices.
Conflicting Messages
From a patient perspective, the discharge of MRSA patients is 
an ostensibly incongruent routine. After being treated in strict 
isolation and under a stringent hygiene regimen, patients are 
simply discharged and informed that MRSA is no risk for healthy 
people (42). This dissonance could lead to confusion and distress 
for patients, relatives, and visitors and add further to potential 
misperceptions of their health risk to others.
Knowledge
Despite the laws and efforts surrounding improving information 
and communication, knowledge levels have been mixed. The lack 
of knowledge in health-care professionals is seen as an influenc-
ing factor for increasing prevalence of nosocomial infections 
(43–46).
Risk Communication Policy
The risk communication policies of the five EU countries were 
found to contain only information relating to risks faced by 
people directly involved in health care, such as hospital staff and 
patients. These policies were based on the same risk assessment 
that is used to determine which patients should be screened for 
MRSA. It focuses on health-care workers, long-term care, chroni-
cally ill patients, and patients facing surgery. There has only been 
little effort to address MRSA as problem in and for the general 
population (47). This narrow view is congruent with the lack of 
concern for the role of other factors, such as behavior, implemen-
tation of guidelines, etc., seen in other areas.
Media Coverage
The consensus in the literature is that the UK media coverage, 
especially within the tabloid newspapers, has been at times 
sensationalist. However, the pressure placed on governments in 
response to the extensive media coverage has played a significant 
role in a number of policy changes which have contributed to 
the decline in incidence of deaths and bacteremia associated with 
MRSA (48, 49).
Public Perception
The infection threat posed by MRSA is difficult to communicate. 
Researchers have blamed contradicting risk communication 
about necessary hygienic measures as one problem (50). They see 
that even necessary cleaning routines have not been implemented 
in hygiene plans (50). More importantly, risk communication 
messages might have influenced the risk perception of health-
care workers, patients, and the public inappropriately. The mes-
sage that MRSA is not an infectious diseases agent that can lead 
to outbreaks outside of health-care facilities and also does not do 
harm to family members has direct consequences for the epide-
miology of MRSA and could, in turn, have led to the perception 
that MRSA is a harmless pathogen only affecting those who are 
already ill (42).
summary
The data situation in the countries is patchy at best, and thus it 
is difficult to offer up any firm conclusions regarding the overall 
burden of disease in the countries studied. What is clear, however, 
is that knowledge and information about the infectious disease 
burden is limited in the general population, and this lack of clarity 
has led to a growth in misconceptions surrounding the threat of 
MRSA.
The variability of recommendations within, and across, coun-
tries could be contributing to the perception of inconsistency, and 
therefore, this should be looked, potentially, as part of a wider 
strategy designed to improve risk communication. Having incon-
sistent guidelines and practices in place may also be affecting the 
level at which recommended behaviors are adopted. This is an 
area that would require more research.
The risk communication of MRSA has several weaknesses: 
there are misleading messages in the official statements and a 
gap between the official communications and guidelines, with 
inconsistent adoption of the latter at the provider level.
This discrepancy between the official, explicit health messages 
around MRSA and the implicit messages stemming from the 
performance of infection control measures should, therefore, be 
a key target for those wishing to improve the accuracy of percep-
tions regarding the health risks of MRSA.
recommendation
The increasing burden of antimicrobial resistance and health-
care-associated infections has been reflected in growing public 
awareness, for example with major health policy organizations 
urging countries to improve their risk communication and 
MRSA prevention strategies. These ought to be revised to 
also address the general public. Thus far, most countries have 
adopted a universal risk-based approach addressing affected 
groups, without differentiating between groups, or addressing 
the wider public. Health policy and practice has also focused 
on individual infection control measures and place the major-
ity of responsibility on the individual. Organizational aspects 
(patient/health-care worker ratios, architecture, etc.) have not 
been prominently discussed. The rational use of antibiotics 
and antibiotic stewardship is a significant move designed to 
place greater responsibility for the control of HCAIs on medi-
cal professionals. However, the key message, often included in 
national risk communication strategies, that MRSA is a problem 
only for those who are already ill is misleading. In fact, MRSA 
is a problem affecting society as a whole. MRSA is a problem 
for healthy people as they can transmit the disease; MRSA is a 
problem for treating too many patients in too narrow spaces. 
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MRSA is a problem because MRSA patients are only reluctantly 
identified. And finally, MRSA is a problem because the explicit 
and implicit messages of MRSA are often inconsistent, if not 
contradictory.
The problem of health care-related infections and antimicrobial 
resistance can only be tackled in a more holistic approach regard-
ing reconsideration of affected groups, health-care organization, 
architecture, and a rational use of antibiotics—and by revising a 
risk communication strategy accordingly.
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